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ABSTRACT 
Overlay multicast streaming is built out of loosely coupled end-hosts (peers) that con-
tribute resources to stream media to other peers. Peers, however, can be malicious. They 
may intentionally wish to disrupt the multicast service or cause confusions to other peers. 
We present a signed acknowledgement scheme and three monitoring schemes to identify ma-
licious peers in the overlay network. These schemes compute a level of trust for each peer 
in the network. Peers with a trust value below a threshold are considered to be malicious. 
Results from our simulations indicate that the proposed schemes detect a high percentage of 
malicious peers with different cheating patterns, malicious peer percentages, network size and 
topologies. Experiments carried on the PlanetLab indicate no degradation in quality after the 
implementation of the proposed monitoring schemes. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Overlay multicast (also known as Application Layer Multicast) for media streaming has 
received significant research interest in recent years (1; 2; 16). Peers form an overlay structure 
to relay data to one another. The popular overlay multicast structure is a tree where a peer is 
either an interior node or a leaf node. An interior peer forwards data to its child peers) while a 
leaf peer does not forward any data. Hence, the scalability and reliability of overlay multicast 
streaming depends on the level of contribution and cooperation of peers that are interior 
nodes. Peers, however, are less trustworthy and less reliable than routers in performing the 
data forwarding function. Thus, data streamed over an overlay tree is exposed to variety of 
faults ranging from intentional to unintentional errors. Intentional errors could be carried out 
by malicious nodes that strive to decrease the effectiveness and usefulness of media streaming 
applications. Examples of malicious behavior are as follows: 
• Type A: Peers stop or delay forwarding data to other peers. 
• Type B: Peers corrupt or change data before sending it down the overlay tree. 
• Type C: Peers falsely claim that they did not receive data or received corrupted data. 
• Type D: Peers flood the overlay tree by sending a large amount of other data along the 
tree. 
• Type E: Peers simulate periodic failure and recovery, thus disturbing the stability of the 
tree. 
In this thesis, our aim is to identify peers exhibiting Type A, B and C forms of malicious 
behaviors in order to exclude them from an on-going multicast session. Other types of malicious 
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behavior including collusion would be an extension to the current work. Malicious activities, 
besides generating extra network traffic, can cause denial of services and have a social impact. 
For instance, malicious peers can change the multicast content to damage the reputation of the 
original broadcasting source or can provide wrong evacuation routes in a disaster relief effort. 
Detecting the presence of malicious activities using existing fault detection techniques (7; 
8; 10; 12; 17; 18; 21; 25) is not sufficient since they do not identify peers that are the source of 
these malicious activities. Effective techniques are needed to locate malicious peers in order to 
apply methods that limit the effect of malicious activities. Existing reputation management 
schemes developed for peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems (22) are not directly suitable for 
estimating goodness of peers in overlay multicast streaming. In P2P file sharing systems, peers 
receiving a file assume that the peer sending the file is the file owner. The reputation manager 
penalizes the reputation of the sending peer according to feedbacks from the peers receiving the 
file from this sender. The reputation manager also considers the reputation of the reporting 
peers to reduce the effect of faulty feedbacks. However, in overlay multicast streaming, most 
sending peers (except the tree root) are not the owners of the multicast data; they simply 
forward the data coming from their parent peer. Therefore, in overlay multicast streaming, if 
a good peer receives corrupted data, its parent need not always be malicious since the malicious 
peer may be the ancestor peer of the parent peer. Furthermore, a malicious peer may cheat in 
some branches and may not cheat in other branches of the multicast tree. Locating malicious 
peers in overlay multicast streaming is, therefore, non-trivial as illustrated below. 
Consider the chain of peers in Figure 1. The arrows indicate the multicast data flowing 
through the peers. Assume that peers Bl and B2 are bad (malicious) whereas peers Gl , G2
and G3 are good (non-malicious). 
Case 1: Peer Bl stops sending data to peer G2. Hereafter, we use the case that peers 
stop sending data to also represent the case of peers sending corrupted data or delaying data 
forwarding, since all these cases are similar in terms of peer interactions. All peers (G2 i G3i
and B2) down the chain complain that they did not receive the data. Peer G3 accuses an 
innocent peer G2. Peer G2 accuses peer Bl . The malicious peer Bl lies that it has already 
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sent the data to G2. Peer G2 cannot prove its innocence to peer G3 and cannot substantiate 
its accusation of peer Bl . 
Case 2: Peer B1 stops sending data to peer G2. All downstream peers (G2i G3, and B2) 
complain as in Case 1. However, the malicious peer Bl accuses its parent (an innocent peer 
Gl) of not sending the data to it. Peer G1 cannot prove its innocence. 
Case 3: Peer B2 issues a false complaint that it has not received data to spoil the reputation 
of peer G3. The parent (peer G3) in this case has no means to prove that it has forwarded the 
data. 
Figure 1.1 Data flow between peers 
To the best of our knowledge, Trust-Aware-M~clticast (TAM) (11) and Signed Acknowledg-
ment (SA) are the only overlay multicast protocols proposed to identify peers that exhibit 
uncooperative behavior which includes malicious activities. These schemes belong to a self 
surveillance approach in which peers report observed behavior to a trust manager. TAM and 
SA are similar in that they use trust management schemes to assign a trust value to each peer 
participating in a multicast session. This trust value is calculated based on the complaints 
sent by peers to the trust manager when encountering undesirable behavior. Peers whose trust 
values are below a threshold are considered malicious. 
Our contributions in this thesis are as follows. 1) We have proposed three novel malicious 
peer identification schemes. They are a) Random Monitoring (RM) b) Sweep Monitoring 
(SM) and c) Hybrid Monitoring (HM). All these monitoring schemes belong to the trust agent 
monitoring approach. This approach uses trusted peers to monitor (police) normal peers in a 
multicast session. Trusted peers can be provided as a national infrastructure like distributed 
caches in NLANR caching project (NLA). 1Vlonitoring peers are trusted peers that join a 
multicast tree at a particular location (i.e., it becomes the child of some normal peer. Normal 
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peers are neither monitoring peers nor the broadcasting source. Based on the packet it receives 
from its parent, a monitoring peer determines the presence of malicious activities using existing 
fault detection techniques. The trust value of its parent and other related peers are updated. 
The three proposed schemes represent different ways to determine the sampling locations. Peers 
whose trust value is below a threshold are considered malicious. 2) We have provided a formula 
to calculate the buffer space requirements for the monitoring peers. This buffer is maintained 
to avoid jitter that could be introduced due to monitoring peers. 3) We have designed an 
analytical model for the monitoring schemes. 4) We have evaluated the effectiveness of the 
monitoring schemes in identifying malicious peers and have compared them with each other 
and with our SA scheme through simulations. 5) We have performed experiments on the 
PlanetLab to validate our buffer space calculations. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We present related work in Chapter 2. We 
present our proposed work in detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present our analytical model 
and show simulation and experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
schemes. We discuss other related issues in Chapter 5. Finally, we offer some concluding 
remarks in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 
One of the primary concerns in using an overlay network for media streaming is correctness 
of data. Current overlays are not secure; even a small fraction of malicious peers can prevent 
correct message delivery throughout the overlay (4) and hence data delivered over such a 
system is potentially exposed to a great number of faults. Limited central management to 
oversee operations makes it difficult to detect and repair the faults and even more challenging 
to identify the peers causing them. Existing work in this field can be broadly classified into 
the following categories. 
• Approach using incentives for collaboration 
• Fault detection approach 
• Self surveillance approach 
2.1 Approach using incentives for collaboration 
These schemes propose a design of P2P systems where participant peers are given incentives 
for providing service. A peer is punished in the form of bad service for cheating the system. 
Ngan et al. (15) implement this by having every peer maintain values of the number of objects 
sent and number of objects received. The difference of these two numbers expresses the debt 
or credit of that peer. The debt and credit values are used by peers to discriminate freeloaders 
from other good peers, allowing them to refuse service to freeloaders. Chu and Zhang (5) define 
altruism of a peer as the ratio (K) of the bandwidth contributed (fi ) to the overlay and the 
bandwidth received (r2). 
fz 
r2 = K 
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A content publisher sets the minimum level of altruism for each peer in the network. Thus 
an altruism policy defines the bandwidth f2 peer i should contribute to receive in return a 
bandwidth of ri. If a peer contributes more bandwidth, it is entitled to receive more in return. 
Habib and Chuang (9) adopt ascore-based incentive mechanism that encourages cooper-
ation through indirect reciprocity. Users choose their contribution level in order to maximize 
their individual utility. The contribution level xi of user i is converted into a score Si, which 
in turn is mapped into a percentile rank Ri, determining the rank of the user among all users 
in the system. Peer selection depends on the rank ordering of the requestors and candidate 
suppliers. When a peer first joins the system, it begins with a score of zero and receives 
best-effort service. If a user wishes to receive better-than-best-effort streaming, it must earn 
a positive score by contributing to the system. User utility Ui is a function of the streaming 
session quality Q and the contribution cost C is given by 
where a2 and b2 define the values of streaming quality and contribution cost to user i. 
A rational user will determine its optimal contribution level x2 (or equivalently, optimal 
score Si or optimal rank RZ) to maximize its utility. 
Incentive schemes provide differential service based on the contribution of the participating 
peers. They discourage free loaders, however they do not detect data corruption or prevent 
malicious activities. 
2.2 Fault detection approach 
Fault detection methods are directed towards detecting errors in the data stream. Byzantine 
fault tolerance (12) is a form of majority voting but it is not applicable for large scale distributed 
systems (17). One common way to verify data integrity is to let the server sign every packet 
or hash of each packet with its private key (20). A peer caches the packets as well as the 
signatures and verifies the validity of the data. Methods proposed in (7; 25; 10; 18; 8; 21) are 
similar in that they rely on encryption to detect the presence of corrupted data. Gennaro and 
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Rohatgi (7) present two different schemes, one for the off-line case where the entire stream 
content is known in advance to the signer and the other for the on-line case where the stream 
content is generated in real-time. For the of£ line case, it suggests embedding in each packet 
PZ the hash of the next packet PZ+i • After embedding the hash within the packets the signer 
signs only the first packet. While this method is elegant and provides for a stream signature, 
it does not tolerate packet loss. The biggest disadvantage, however, is that the entire stream 
of packets needs to be known in advance. In the on-line scheme, the sender initially sends 
a signed public key. Then he sends the first packet along with its signed hash based on the 
public key sent in the previous step. The first packet also contains a new public key to be 
used to verify the signature on the second packet. This structure is repeated for all the future 
packets. Wong and Lam (25) propose to use Merkles signature trees to sign streams. The 
key idea is to make asymmetric digital signatures more efficient is to amortize one signature 
generation and verification over multiple messages. Merkle (13) describes how to construct 
a hash tree over all messages where the signer only digitally signs the root. The limitation 
of these schemes are that they are not robust against packet loss. In addition, the one-time 
signature communication overhead is substantial (17). Habib et al. (10) propose the use of 
message digests for fault detection. To reduce the overhead incurred in the transmission of 
digests, the scheme uses a probabilistic approach and generates digests only for a subset of 
segments. Pappas et al. (17) suggest the use of bloom filters to detect data corruption. Bloom 
filter is a space efficient data structure that consists of an array of m bits and a set of k 
independent hash functions, H1, H2, . . . , H~, with range [O,m - 1]. Hash values H(A)l , H(A)2 , 
. . . , H(A)k are computed for the recently received packets. This bloom filter is exchanged 
with other peers in the network receiving the same content. A mismatch of the bloom filter 
transmitted and the bloom filter stored would identify corruption of data. Goodrich (8) uses 
encryption techniques and message digests to verify integrity of packets in flooding algorithms. 
The work in (8) however differs from those in (7; 25; 10; 18) by its ability to identify malicious 
peers. It is based on a cryptographic hashing strategy called leap-frog linl~ing. The initial setup 
involves a simple key distribution. Specifically, for each peer x the set N(x) contains the peers 
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that are neighbors of x (which does not include x itself). That is, 





Figure 2.1 Leap-Frog technique 
A secret key k(x) is shared by all peers in N(x), but not by x itself. The message that is 
broadcasted to a peer x, is of the form (s, M, hl, h2), where s is the sender, M is the message, 
hl and h2 are cryptographic hash values. hl and h2 are encrypted with keys shared by N(s) 
and N(x) respectively. hl enables x to authenticate the message from s and h2 enables N(x) 
to authenticate the message sent by x. Thus any peer s that sends a modified message will be 
discovered by one of its neighbors x E N(s). This technique has a loophole. A malicious peer 
operating under this scheme can escape identification and can cheat the system by changing 
the hash of the message. In the above example, malicious peer s can change h2 and escape 
detection from x. This is possible since h2 is encrypted with a key shared by N(x) and because 
x cannot check the validity of h2, it forwards h2 to peers in N(x). However amodified/incorrect 
h2 which is forwarded by x will mismatch with the hash generated from message M causing 
peers in N(x) to falsely assume that the message M has been modified. Thus, peers in N(x) 
will accuse an innocent peer x. 
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2.3 Self surveillance approach 
In the self surveillance approach, peers collaborate with one another or with a centralized 
node to identify malicious peers. The centralized node which is commonly referred to as Trust 
manager or Reputation manager uses peer feedback and reputation management schemes to 
identify malicious peers. 
Peers complain to the trust manager whenever they detect faults in the media. Faults are 
detected using existing fault detection schemes (see Section 2.2). Faults here include cases 
where (i) peers do not receive data (ii) peers receive late arriving data or (iii) peers receive 
corrupted datal . The trust manager updates the trust value of peers based on complaints 
received. In a given tree branch, the trust manager could receive complaints from multiple 
peers. For instance, a malicious peer located near the top of the tree can trigger several 
complaints from all the peers in its subtree. The trust manager cannot judge goodness of the 
peers based on a single positive feedback or a complaint received from peers. Given a pair of 
peers with aparent-child relationship, either the parent or the child or both the peers could 
be good as illustrated below: 
• Bad-parent-good-child: The sender (B1 in Figure 1) is bad, but the receiver (G2 in 
Figure 1) is good. 
• Good-parent-bad-child: The sender (G3 in Figure 1) is good, but the receiver (B2 in 
Figure 1) is bad. 
• Bad-ancestor: Both the sender and the receiver (G2 to G3 in Figure 1) are good, but 
at least one of the ancestors (B1 in Figure 1) is bad. 
Currently there are two self surveillance schemes which identify malicious peers in an overlay 
multicast streaming system. 
1To detect peers changing content, additional information is needed to indicate that content has been changed. 
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2.3.1 Trust Aware Multicast (TAM) Scheme 
TAM (11) computes a level of trust for each peer in the network and adapts the multicast 
tree according the trustworthiness of peers. The multicast tree is is adapted in such a way 
that more trusted nodes are located closer to the root node. According to the behavior a peer 
manifests in the system, the trust manager updates that peers' quality or trustworthiness. 
When the trustworthiness falls below a distrust threshold the children of such a peer is relo-
cated. Peers that report any type of problems are also relocated to a new place. The distrust 
threshold is dynamically adjusted based on system load. However, the paper does not give 
any information on how the distrust threshold is adjusted based on the load. To improve the 
quality of the tree, TAM finds pairs of nodes in the multicast tree such that a lower quality 
peer is located at a position that is suitable for a node with higher quality. Such pairs of nodes 
are swapped regularly along with their subtree to improve the quality of the tree. 
2.3.2 Signed Acknowledgment (SA) Scheme 
SA is related work proposed by the author and is suitable for TCP-friendly streaming proto-
cols (24) or application-level protocols that use acknowledgment messages to adjust streaming 
bandwidth based on traffic conditions. SA uses trust management and signed acknowledgments 
to identify malicious peers. Signed acknowledgment messages are used by peers to prove their 
innocence when they are falsely accused of not sending the data or for sending incorrect data. 
We have implemented a prototype of SA with TCP on RedHat Linux, an overview of the 
implementation is provided in Section 6. 
A malicious peer located at a higher position in the multicast tree will result in complaints 
from all the peers in the subtree. To narrow down from a series of complaints to a pair of peers 
such that one peer in this pair is a true malicious peer, SA utilizes the following fault -node 
localization scheme. 
Fault-node Localization Scheme: From a chain of complaining peers belonging to the same tree 
branch, the trust manager picks the topmost complaining peer and its parent as a suspicious 
pair. 
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Applying the above localization scheme to each of the scenarios discussed in the introduc-
tion section of the paper results in the following. 
• Case 1: Peers G2, G3, and BZ complain to the trust manager. The trust manager picks 
the topmost complaining peer (G2) and its parent (Bl ) as a suspicious pair. 
• Case 2: In this case, malicious peer Bl sends a false complaint about peer G1 to the 
trust manager. The trust manager neglects complaints from peers G2, G3 i and B2 since 
peer Bl is the topmost complaining peer and identifies peers G1 and Bl as a suspicious 
pair. 
• Case 3: The trust manager identifies peers G2 and B2 as a suspicious pair since B2
issues a false complaint to the trust manager. 
In all the three cases, the localization scheme reduces the chain of peers to a suspicious 
pair, the trust manager can now start analyzing this pair of peers in order to identify the most 
probable malicious peer, by using (i) signed acknowledgments and (ii) calculation of the trust 
value of peers. The pseudo code for a peer and for a trust manager are shown in Algorithms 1 
and 2, respectively. 
Algorithm 1 Client of the SA scheme 
l: Receive the data from the parent 
2: if data is faulty then 
3: /* Data not received or late or corrupted */ 
4: Complain to the trust manager 
5: else 
6: Send an signed acknowledgment to the parent 
7: Forward the data to its child peers) 
8: if receiving an acknowledgment from its child in a timeout period then 
9: Cache the acknowledgment 
10: else 
11: Resend data until timeout 
12: end if 
13: end if 
A child peer is required to send an acknowledgment signed by it to its parent when receiving 
the data (Algorithm 1 Line 6). The parent peer of this child can present the signed acknowledg-
ment to the trust manager when falsely accused by its malicious child of not sending the data. 
Each peer caches the signed acknowledgment messages for some time2. We have modified the 
ZFirst-in-first-out cache replacement can be used 
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Algorithm 2 Trust manager of the SA scheme 
1: loop 
2: if receiving a complaint then 
3: Perform fault-node localization to identify a suspicious pair 
4: Request signed acknowledgments from the parent of the suspicious pair 
5: Receive the requested acknowledgment from the parent 
6: if correct acknowledgements produced then 
7: Identify the child as malicious and take a necessary action to punish it 
8: else 
9: Update trust values of both peers in the suspicious pair (see Section 3.3) 
10: Identify a peer as malicious for the peer with the trust value below a threshold 
11: Relocate the child peer of the suspicious pair to a new location in the tree 
12: end if 
13: end if 
14: end loop 
TCP acknowledgment mechanism on RedHat Linux to include the signed acknowledgment to 
verify that our idea is implementable. When it is not possible for the trust manager to identify 
which peer of the suspicious pair is malicious based on signed acknowledgments, the trust 
manager will decrease the trust value of both peers in the suspicious pair (Algorithm 2 Line 
9) . The details of the trust value calculation are described in Section 3.3. FS.irthermore, the 
child along with its subtree will be assigned to a different parent chosen by the trust manager. 
The relocation of the child is to give a chance for a good child to escape from a bad parent 
and vice-versa. To ensure jitter free data, peers need to buffer its data in a look-ahead buffer. 
The size of the buffer can be calculated similarly to that of the monitoring scheme which is 
discussed in later sections. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED TRUST AGENT MONITORING 
APPROACH 
3.1 Overview 
e propose the use of monitoring schemes and trust management to identify malicious peers 
in an overlay multicast tree. Monitoring schemes use trusted peers to monitor peers during a 
multicast session and assume the presence of a trust manager to maintain trust related data 
structures. Trusted peers rely on existing fault detection techniques to detect faulty data and 
can be provided as a national infrastructure like distributed caches of the NLANR caching 
project (NLA). 
A trusted peer, also referred to as monitoring peer, joins the overlay tree at different 
positions, samples the media forwarded by its parent peer for a limited period of time and 
checks the data for correctness. This can be done efficiently by comparing the hash of the data 
being streamed with the hash obtained from the original content. Depending on the result, 
the monitoring peer updates the trust value of the parent peer. After sampling the peer for 
a limited period of time, the monitoring peer moves to another position in the overlay tree 
to sample data sent out by another peer. Normal peers have limited bandwidth. This fixed 
bandwidth limits the number of children a peer can support in the overlay tree. Monitoring 
peers thus have to join the tree by replacing an existing child of a peer. This replaced peer is 
then made the child of the monitoring peer. 
A trust manager is assigned with the job of trust management. Monitoring peers report 
the results of data sampling to the trust manager. The trust manager collates reports from all 
monitoring peers and calculates the trust value/goodness of peers participating in the multicast 
session. The trust manager also decides if a peer is to be considered as malicious or not. In 
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this thesis, a peer is considered malicious if its trust value is below a specified trust threshold. 
Once a malicious peer has been identified, appropriate actions can be taken depending on the 
policy of the broadcasting source. Note that the trust manager may be same as or different 
from the broadcasting source. 
3.2 Monitoring Schemes 
Ideally we would like every normal peer to be monitored by a monitoring peer at all times 
during the session. This assumption is impractical and also not scalable for large overlay 
trees. Thus we assume only few monitoring peers to be available for monitoring during the 
session. Let {ml, m2, mg, . . . , m~,} denote the monitoring peers and {nl , n2 , n3, • • • , nl} denote 
the normal peers in the overlay multicast tree. We propose the following three monitoring 
schemes to identify the malicious peers in the multicast tree. 
t+a t+2a t+3a 
Figure 3.1 RM: Monitoring peer ml samples random peers. 
• Random Monitoring (RM): Monitoring peers are loosely coupled and join the network at 
random positions (Figure 3.2) . Monitoring peers sample the data for a certain period of 
time before moving to another randomly picked position in the tree. When a monitoring 
peer comes across bad data it reports it to the trust manager. 
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Second Stage 
t+a t+2a t + 3a t+4a 
Figure 3.2 SM: Monitoring peers ml ,m2 and m3 sample alternate normal 
peers of a branch. 
First Stage 
0 m 
® `YG ~ ~ ~ '~iV 
O~ 
'Mv ® ®®~ 
Malicious Region 
Sweep 
Figure 3.3 HM: ml , . . . , ms are static monitoring peers and m7, m8 are 
dynamic monitoring peers. 
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• Sweep Monitoring (SM): A monitoring peer operating under the RM scheme on receiving 
bad data cannot accuse its parent peer as malicious. This is because the bad data 
could have originated from any ancestor of its parent. Ex: In Figure 3.2, peer ml on 
receiving bad data from n2 cannot be sure if the source of bad data is n2 or nl . S1VI 
is designed to overcome this drawback. In SM, monitoring peers on receiving bad data 
can conclusively blame its immediate parent to be malicious. This is accomplished by 
making the monitoring peers alternate with normal peers to form a chain of peers. This 
chain of peers starts with the root of the tree or with a monitoring peer and ends with 
a normal peer (Figure 3.2). This chain corresponds to a branch in the overlay tree. The 
monitoring peers in the chain sample the data for some time before shifting to a different 
branch in the tree. The chain of monitoring peers sweeps through all the branches of 
the tree by moving in a way such that peers at the lower levels move first followed by 
the peers above it. Algorithms 3 and 4 describe the way in which monitors in the SM 
scheme sweep through all the branches of the tree. 
• Hybrid Monitoring (HM): This is a combination of random and sweep monitoring schemes. 
The motivation behind the HM scheme is to minimize network instability that can be 
caused due to frequent join and unjoin of monitoring peers. Monitoring peers in HM 
are of two types: 1) Static: These peers do not change their positions during media 
streaming. They join the network at fixed positions and occupy the upper levels of the 
overlay tree. 2) Dynamic: These peers implement random sampling and sweep sampling 
interchangeably and they change their positions to sample different peers at different 
intervals. Dynamic peers sample peers that are at the lower levels of the tree. Malicious 
peer identification involves two stages. In the first stage, dynamic peers perform ran-
dom sampling and in the second stage they perform sweep sampling. In the first stage, 
sampling of data results in identifying regions of the tree that are more probable to have 
malicious peers. This localization is done by picking branches of the tree between two 
monitoring peers that show malicious activities beyond a malicious activity threshold. 
In the second stage, dynamic monitoring peers regroup and sweep the regions that have 
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been identified as malicious in the earlier stage (Figure 3.2). After the sweep operation, 
dynamic peers continue to implement random sampling at the lower levels of the tree till 
another malicious region is identified. The advantage of this method is that static peers 
at the upper levels of the tree provide more stability since they do not change positions. 
Also since the dynamic peers are at the lower levels of the tree only few peers are affected 
during the join and unjoin operations. 
Algorithm 3 Sweep Monitoring::ChangePosition() 
l: if nextMonitor->ChangePosition() then 
2: /*nextMonitor represents the downstream monitor*/ 
3: /* Downstream Monitor has changed its position*/ 
4: return true 
5: else 
6: if Connected to the lastChild of parent then 
7: /* Cannot change position of this monitor. Upstream monitor needs to change position */ 
8: return false 
9: else 
10: /* Change position of this monitor*/ 
11: newChild = NextChildofParent(); /*Gets the next child of this monitors parent */ 
12: currentChild =this->child; /*Gets the current child of the monitor */ 
13: SetChild(newChild,this) /*Set the monitor as parent of newChild*/ 
14: SetChild(currentChild,this->parent) /*Set currentchild as the child of the monitor's parent*/ 
15: /* Set new parents on all monitors down the tree*/ 
16: nextMonitor->Join(this) 
17: return true 
18: end if 
19: end if 
Algorithm 4 Sweep Monitoring::Join() 
1: /*Gets the first child of the upstream monitor */ 
2: newParent = parentMonitor->firstChild; 
3: /*Set this monitor as child of newParent*/ 
4: SetChild(this,newParent) 
5: nextMonitor->Join(this) 
3.2.1 Implementation details of monitoring schemes 
In this section we look into the implementation details of the proposed monitoring schemes. 
In RM, the server assigns to each monitoring peer, a set consisting of normal peers that needs 
to be monitored. Monitoring peers select peers from this set for sampling. These sets are 
non-overlapping and are updated periodically by the server whenever a peer joins or leaves 
the network. Each update will require a message to be sent by the server to the monitoring 
peer. In SM, the number of monitoring peers in each chain of peers is determined by the 
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height of the overlay tree. Monitoring peers in the system are divided into different groups 
by the server. Each group has enough number of members to sweep even the longest branch 
of the tree. For example, if there are 9 monitoring peers and the height of the tree is 4, then 
the monitoring peers are arranged into 2 groups of 4 peers each. The remaining 1 monitoring 
peer remains unused. Each group is then randomly assigned a branch of the tree. After 
sampling the assigned branch, the group of monitoring peers picks the next branch using 
the Algorithms 3 and 4. Monitoring peers communicate with other members of its group 
during a sweep operation. After sampling a branch, if a monitoring peer cannot change its 
position/parent (ChangePosition() returns false), it informs the monitoring peer above it in the 
chain to execute the ChangePosition() function. If the monitoring peer changes its position 
then it informs other monitoring peers down the chain (step 4 of the Join()) to select new 
parents. In HM, dynamic peers are associated with a set of normal peers and also are divided 
into groups. Dynamic peers select peers from the set for sampling. When a branch crosses a 
malicious activity threshold, the server instructs the dynamic monitoring peers of a group to 
sweep the malicious branch. 
3.2.2 Protocol for monitoring peers to join and unjoin 
Jitter can be introduced due to the periodic join and leave of the monitoring peers. To avoid 
any jitter, a separate overlay tree consisting of only monitoring peers also referred as alternate 
overlay tree is constructed (Figure 3.2.3). Both overlay trees have the same media sent over 
them. The stream of data being sent over the alternate overlay tree is buffered in a media 
look-ahead buffer by every monitoring peer. An alternate overlay tree may be an overhead, 
but in addition to avoiding jitter, it can facilitate fault detection and also minimize the impact 
of malicious attacks. It can also be used to stream data temporarily to peers whose parents 
have crashed or have abruptly left the system until that peer finds a new parent. The content 
of this media look-ahead buffer is filled with the data sent through the alternate overlay tree. 
Monitoring peers stream data from this media look-ahead buffer to a child peer whenever it 
joins the overlay tree. 
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Consider the following scenario: Peers nl and n2 are normal peers that are part of the 
media streaming multicast session. Normal peers may or may not be malicious. Peer nl sends 
the data packet to peer n2. 
Let tl be the time needed for a frame to reach peer n2 from peer nl . Let ml be a monitoring 
peer that is introduced between nl and n2 to sample data sent by nl such that the time needed 
for a frame to reach peer ml from peer nl is t2 seconds and the time needed for a frame to 
reach peer n2 from peer ml is t3 seconds (Figure 3.2.3). 
Case 1 : (t2 -f- t3) > tl 
Peer ml introduces a delay that may result in a jitter. To avoid this, the following is proposed: 
• Peer ml receives data from the server through a separate stream which it uses to check 
for correctness of data. This stream can be used to prevent the jitter. 
• Peer ml sends the data that it receives from the server directly to peer n2 as soon as it 
joins the network. 
• Peer ml will sample the contents sent by peer nl and drop those packets. 
• In order to avoid jitters, the overlay tree consisting of monitoring peers must be sent 
data earlier than the overlay tree consisting of normal peers. 
• The upper bound on the buffer that is to be maintained by each monitoring peer m2 is 
equal to the worst possible delay that can be introduced by adding a monitoring peer. 
Later, in section 3.2.3 we introduce a model to calculate the size of the buffer at the 
monitoring peers. 
Case ~: (t2 ~- t3) < tl 
Monitoring peer ml reduces the time taken for a packet to reach peer n2. The monitoring 
peer forwards the contents it receives from the normal peer or can use the buffered content. 
When the monitoring peer leaves the network, it is a graceful exit. As a result of this, it is 
possible to ensure that it stops streaming data to peer n2 only after data from nl reaches it. 
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Data 
Overlay Tree of Monitoring 
Peers 
Figure 3.4 Overlay trees. 







Set of normal nodes 
Set of monitoring nodes 
Time the first data packet was sent over the overlay tree of normal 
nodes (i.e., the start of the multicast streaming session). 
Time at which the first data packet was sent over the overlay tree of 
monitoring nodes 
Propagation delay from the root of the overlay tree of the monitoring 
nodes to reach m2
Propagation delay from the root of the overlay tree of the normal 
peers to reach the n~ 
Buffer size at mi 
Propagation delay between node i and j 
3.2.3 Calculation of look ahead buffer size for monitoring peers 
The size of the buffer to be maintained at the monitoring nodes for comparison and to 
prevent jitter can be calculated as follows: 
Figure 3.5 Monitoring peer ml joins between peer nl and n2. 
At time t, the monitoring peer m2 has data packets with id's in the interval: 
• mZ = ~t — t~-n, — dmz — bm,2 , t — t?-n, — dmz] 
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and normal peer n~ has the data packet with id 
• nj = [t—to—dn~] 
Suppose the monitoring node mi samples data from the parent of node n~, then to prevent 
jitter we want node n~ to receive data from monitoring node m2 starting from time t. In 
other words, the first packet from m2 must reach n~ at time t. Given the propagation delay of 
PD~,,.Li n; ), monitoring node mi must send the first packet at least by time t — PD~mi,n;)
• The packet id of this packet can be calculated as 
• At time t — PD~.,,.,,i ,n~ ) , mi must have the packet with 
id = t — (tn -F- dn~) in its buffer. 
Thus, 
• t — PD(mZ,n~) — tm — dm2 — bm2 < t — (tn + dn,) < t — PD(mZ,n~) — t,,,, — dmi 
Finally, 
• bm,i > to — tm + dn~ — dmz — PD(.,-,-Lzin~ ) 
To summarize, the buffer size of the monitoring node is dependent on the propagation delay 
between the server and monitoring node, server and normal node and monitoring node and 
the normal node. This buffer size can be tuned by varying the time at which the media is sent 
to the normal and the monitoring overlay trees. 
3.3 'Dust Management 
The trust management system comprises of a trust manager that calculates the trust 
value/goodness of the peers in the multicast session. It maintains the following trust related 
data structures: 
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• Trust vector: It is a vector of n floating point numbers that captures the n most recent 
transactions. We say that a transaction occurs when a peer receives a data packet. 
A negative number represents an unsuccessful transaction whereas a positive number 
represents a successful transaction. 
• Trust value: It is a numeric value that indicates the goodness of a peer. 
The trust manager uses a sigmoidal function (see Figure 3.3) to map the trust vector to the 
trust value as follows: 
Trust value = 
1 
I + e -x 
where "x" is the sum of individual values in the trust vector. With the sigmoidal function, 
a good peer will not experience a significant drop in its trust value when it receives a bad 
feedback. Similarly, a malicious peer will have to perform several successful transactions to 
improve its trust value. 
Trusf Value 
-2 -1 1 2 
Figure 3.6 Sigmoidal Metric for trust value 
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All monitoring schemes and our previous signed acknowledgement (SA) based technique 
(Section 2.3.2) use the same trust-related data structures and the same sigmoidal function to 
calculate the trust values from the trust vectors. However, these schemes differ in the way 
they update the trust vectors. For each transaction, an update of a trust vector is done by 
shifting the values in the trust vector by one position to the right and by inserting the value 
representing the result of the most recent transaction at the left most position. 
Figure 3.7 Random Sampling. 
Figure 3.8 Sweep Sampling. 
• Updating a Trust Vector for SA: On receiving a complaint, the trust manager updates 
the trust vector with a value which is the negative of the other peer's current trust value. 
On not receiving a complaint from a peer, the trust manager updates the trust vector 
with a positive constant. 
• Updating a Trust Vector for Monitoring schemes: Monitoring peers join the overlay tree 
at different positions and periodically update the trust vector of all the peers between 
itself and another monitoring peer above it along the same tree branch. For instance, in 
Figure 3.3, peers ml and m2 are monitoring peers operating under the random sampling 
scheme. Peer m2 samples the data sent by peer n4 and periodically updates the trust 
vector of all peers above it namely n2, n3 and n4. In sweep monitoring (Figure 3.3), 
since monitoring peers alternate with normal peers, monitoring peers update the trust 
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vector of only its immediate parent. Monitoring peers update the trust vectors of peers 
with a value of -1 on detecting malicious behavior. Whereas, it updates the trust vector 
of peers with a value of +l on receiving correct data. 
25 
CHAPTER 4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we propose an analytical model for RM and SM schemes. The RM analytical 
model provides an upper bound for the speed of detecting malicious peers in the system. The 
SM analytical model provides an upper and lower bound on the true positive values. We 
also discuss about our simulations, experiments, their configuration and the results gathered. 
We compare the proposed schemes using a simulator. Through experiments run over the 
PlanetLab, we look into the effects of the monitoring schemes on the quality of the streamed 
media. 
4.1 Analytical model for RM 
Due to the forwarding nature of streaming systems, monitoring peers on receiving cor-
rupted data cannot blame their immediate parent of being malicious (except in the case of 
sweep monitoring). Because of this limitation we use trust management schemes along with 
monitoring schemes to evaluate the goodness of peers. An ideal scenario would be one, where a 
random monitoring peer can judge the goodness of its parent based only on the data it receives 
from its parent. In other words, if a monitoring peer receives corrupted data, then the parent 
peer is considered to be bad otherwise the parent peer is good. Under such an ideal scenario we 
would like to analytically evaluate the performance of the random monitoring scheme. Since 
in reality such a scheme cannot exist we can consider this analytical model to be give an upper 
bound for the random monitoring scheme. 
The monitoring scheme can be modeled as a Queuing system as follows 
• Monitoring peers are assumed not to sample peers that have already been sampled. 
• Each monitor can be considered as a server of the queuing system. 
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• Each data sampling corresponds to a job. 
• In queuing theory, a server operates on a job for a specific amount of time. In the 
monitoring scheme, a monitoring node samples a peer for specific amount of time. Hence 
the correspondence between the monitoring scheme and a queuing system. A M/D/1 
model represents exponential distributed inter-arrival times, constant service times and 
a single server. Peers joining the overlay tree are assumed to follow a Poisson process. 
A monitoring node samples data for constant time. Thus, a monitoring node along 
with a queue of peers can be viewed as a M/D/1 queue. A monitoring scheme with 
"n" monitoring nodes can be viewed as a system consisting of n copies of the M/D/1 
queue. With "n" M/D/1 queues in the system, an incoming peer is assigned to one of 
the M/D/1 queues with a probability of n. Monitoring nodes (servers) pick a peer from 
their respective queues to sample datal . 
• Given the arrival rate of peers (~), service time (µ) and the number of monitors (n), we 
can find the mean waiting time of the peers in the system. 
• Waiting time signifies the amount of time a peer can be in the system without being 
sampled. 
• Peers arriving at each M/D/1 queue follow a Poisson process with an arrival rate that is 
n times the arrival rate of the peers in the system. 
For a M/D/1 system with arrival rate of ~ and service time of µ, queuing theory specifies 
the average waiting time as shown below: 
p--
µ 
R=  ~ 2µ2 
1The monitoring scheme can also be reduced to a M/D/N queue. In this case, all the incoming peers enter a 
single queue and monitoring nodes pick peers for sampling from one common queue. The waiting time for such 
a model has been calculated in (23) 
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Average number of jobs arriving in one unit of time 
Number of jobs the facility is capable of servicing in one unit of time 
Mean residual service time 
Expected time a job must wait in the queue before being serviced 
Expected time of a job in the system 
_ R _  p 
Wq 
1— P 2µ(l — P) 
W = W q -~- 1
Expected service time "W" for the monitoring scheme corresponds to the average time a 
malicious peer can be in the system before being detected by a monitoring peer. If "W" is 
small, a peer is quickly sampled. Hence, this metric indicates the speed at which a malicious 
peer can be detected using a monitoring scheme. Given the expected arrival rate and the 
service time, this model can also be used to determine the number of monitoring peers needed 
to guarantee sampling of a peer within a specified time. 
4.2 Analytical model for SM 
To calculate the true positive value for SM we assume a binary overlay tree with uniformly 
distributed malicious peers. 
Each time the data is sampled, a chain of monitoring peers covers at least one node of the 
tree. When nsampled = t, the chain of monitoring peers samples a subtree with t leaf nodes. 
Thus a lower bound on the number of nodes sampled during a sweep (nlow) is equal to t and 
the upper bound (nup) on the number of nodes sampled is equal to the maximum number of 
nodes present in the subtree. 
When nsampled = t, the minimum and maximum number of malicious peers sampled is given 
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emax (emin ) 
Number of normal peers in the network 
Number of monitoring peers 
Percentage of malicious peers 
Minimum number of malicious peers sampled in time t. 
Maximum number of malicious peers sampled in time t. 
Probability of cheat (1-Honesty Factor) 
Lower(Upper) bound on the percentage of malicious peers detected 
Number of times the normal peer is sampled 
Number of parallel sweeps 
Height of the overlay tree 
Maximum(Minimum) number of children per peer. 
minSmpl (t) _ 
maxSmpl (t) _ 
plow ~ permal 
100 
nup ~ permal 
100 
1 _/ e 1  )log(t) 
where plow = t, and nup =  \ mai l   . 
1—~ e~n.a~ 
We now look into the upper and lower bounds of true positive values under different cheating 
behaviors. 
• Naive cheating behavior: Since malicious peers cheat all the time, a monitoring peer can 
identify the malicious peer every time it samples it. Hence the percentage of malicious 
peers sampled is equivalent to the true positive value. 
When nmon = ht — 1, 
ForO<t< 2, 
7'Plow ~ 








permal*n ~ 100 
100 




When nmon > ht — 1, we can have multiple chains of peers sweeping the overlay tree. 
nsweep = Lnmon ht-1 ' 
Thus, for 0 < t < 2 
TPup < 100 <  ~ nsweep 
n 
nlow ~ 100 
7'Piow ? ~ nsweep n 
nup ~ 100 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
• Hypocritical-I cheating behavior: Consider a malicious peer with "e" children and a cheat 
probability of pcheat• On sampling this peer, the probability of detecting it as a malicious 
peer is e ~ pcheat• We use this concept to calculate lower and upper bounds of the true 
positive values. 
When nmon = ht — 1, 
plow * 100 
T Plow ~ ~ emin ~ pcheat n 
nup =~ 100 
T Pup < 100 < 
n 
* emax ~ pcheat 
When nmon > ht — 1, 
plow ~ 100 
TPlow ~ ~ emin ~ pcheat ~ nsweep n 
< 100 < 
nup * 100 * e ~ ~ nswee T Pup _ max pcheat p n 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
• Hypocritical-II cheating behavior: Malicious peers of this type do not cheat initially and 
hence in the beginning are not identified by the sweep monitors. However when they 
start cheating they have a naive cheating behavior and hence Equation (4.1) and (4.2) 
can be used to calculate the true positive values. 
4.3 Simulations 
The performance of the monitoring schemes and SA were evaluated using a network simu-
lator written in C-I--I-. The simulator is a discrete event simulator and was designed to generate 
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overlay networks with different tree structures, nodes of different behaviors, multicast sessions 
of different lengths and monitors operating under different schemes. 
The aim of the simulations was to calculate and compare the success of the SA scheme 
and the proposed monitoring schemes (RM, SM, HM) under different scenarios. Recall that 
SA is the Signed Acknowledgment scheme (Section 2.3.2), RM, SM and HM are Random 
Monitoring, Sweep Monitoring and Hybrid Monitoring respectively (Section 3.2). The success 
of the schemes was measured based on 1) True Positive: Percentage of malicious peers that 
are correctly detected as malicious. 2) False Positive: Percentage of good peers that are falsely 
accused as malicious. 3) False Negative: Percentage of malicious peers that have escaped 
detection. False Negative = 100 -True Positive and 4) Message Overhead: Number of messages 
exchanged. An ideal scheme is one that has the highest true positive value, lowest false negative 
value and least message overhead. 
Success of the different schemes was measured by varying the different parameters of the 
network simulator namely, 
• Number of nodes: It indicates the number of normal peers (malicious and non-malicious) 
in the network. Its value was varied from 500 to 1500. 
• Malicious peer types: Three types of malicious peers are simulated in the streaming 
system. 
— Naive: Peers that always cheat. 
— Hypocritical-I: Peers who cheat with certain probability, governed by Honesty factor. 
— Hypocritical-II: Peers who cheat in the beginning of the session and stop cheating 
towards the end. The Honesty factor controls the time at which the peers start 
cheating the system 
• Honesty factor: The cheating pattern of Hypocritical peers is governed by this metric. 
In our simulations, the Honesty factor was set to be either 25°0, 50°0, or 75%. Honesty 
factor indicates the percentage of time a malicious peer is non-malicious. For example, i£ 
Honesty factor is 25%0, then aHypocritical-I peer sends correct packets with a probability 
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of 0.25. ®n the other hand, with a honesty factor of 25°/-o a Hypocritical-II peer does 
not cheat during the first 25°0 of the total number of the packets it sends to its children. 
After that aHypocritical-II peer cheats for the rest of the session. 
• Malicious percentage: It indicates the percentage of malicious peers in the network. Its 
value was varied from 8°~o to 24°0. 
• Session length: It specifies the length of the media session. The value of the Session 
length parameter was varied from 25 units to 75 units. For SA, a unit is defined as the 
time after which a peer sends a feedback to the trust manager. For monitoring schemes, 
a unit is defined as the time after which a monitoring peer needs to change its position 
in the network. In the simulator, "unit" refers to one data packet and is same for both 
SA and the monitoring schemes. 
• Malicious peer behavior: Malicious peers were simulated to cheat the system by not 
sending data or by sending corrupted data, or by issuing false complaints. When a 
malicious peer decides to cheat it randomly picks one of these three behaviors. 
For all results in this section each data point was computed by averaging the results over 
25 independent simulation experiments. We used networks of different size and topologies 
in our simulations. The trust value of the peers was scaled to be within the range of [0-2]; 
peers with their trust value below a threshold were classified to be malicious. Simulations 
were carried out for values of thresholds ranging from [0.9 to 1.1] with intervals of size 0.01. 
For the HM scheme, the ratio of the static to the dynamic monitoring peers was set to 6:4. 
Figures 4.3.l.lto 4.3.1.1 represent true and false positive values when Hypocritical-I and II 
peers were present in the system with equal probability. Figures 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.1 
represent true and false positive values when only Hypocritical-I, Hypocritical-II and Naive 
peers respectively were present in the system. To compare the schemes, we selected the best 
threshold for each scheme. The best threshold is the one that yields the lowest value for the 
threshold metric which is defined as the weighted sum of equally weighted false negative and 
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Table 4.3 Parameters and their values used in simulations 
Parameter Default Variation Steps 
Number of Nodes 1000 500-1500 100 
Session Length 75 25-75 25 
Malicious Percentage 16 5-24 2 
Monitoring Nodes Percentage 10 NA NA 
false positive values. In other words, the results shown here are the best case results wherein 
false negative and false positive values are equally important. 
false negative -~ false positive 
threshold metric = 
2 
4.3.1 Simulation Results 
In the following sections, we analyze the effect of cheating behaviors, multicast session 
lengths and percentage of malicious peers on the success of the proposed schemes. 
4.3.1.1 Effect of Malicious Percentage 
In this study, we fixed the number of normal peers, the number of monitoring peers, and the 
session length to their default values shown in Table 4.3. We varied the percentage of malicious 
peers and the results are shown in Figures 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.1. Simulations were repeated for 
different values of the parameters. Column "Variation" in Table 4.3 indicate the range of 
values used in the simulations and the column "Steps" indicate the incremental value at each 
iteration. 
Results indicate that SM has higher values of true positives and significantly lower values 
of false negatives than any other schemes. SA performs better than RM, however HM performs 
better than SA. True Positives for SA, S1VI and RM schemes remain constant for increasing 
values of malicious peers. However HNI has lower success with increasing values of malicious 
peers. This is because an increase in the number of malicious peers will cause more frequent 
sweep operations in a suspicious subtree resulting in the decrease in the number of randomly 
monitoring peers in other subtrees. 
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A comparison of success of different schemes with respect to the Honesty factor indicate 
that all schemes detect more malicious peers for lesser values of Honesty factor. Hypocritical 
peers that are less honest cheat more frequently, thus the probability of a monitoring peer 
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Figure 4.1 True and False Positive for 75% Honesty factor 
SM has the least false positive value. SA outperforms RM. HM has lesser false positive 
values than RM and SA. The false positive values are constant in monitoring schemes for 
increasing percentages of malicious peers. False positives value increases with the increase in 
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Figure 4.6 True and False Positive for Naive mode of cheating 
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A comparison of different monitoring schemes indicate that SM is a better scheme than 
HM and RM in terms of higher true positive and lower false positive values. 
4.3.1.2 Effect of Multicast Session Length 
The performance of the proposed schemes was checked for different session lengths. For 
these experiments, we simulated a network of 750 nodes and introduced 16°0 of malicious 
nodes. The media session length was set to 25, 50 and 75 to represent short, intermediate 
and long media sessions respectively. As shown in Figure 4.3.1.2, SM has lower success for 
shorter sessions. This is because for short sessions the sweep would not have covered sampling 
most of the peers. It can also be seen that HM has similar performance to RM for very short 
sessions. This is because the malicious regions would not have crossed the threshold, thus a 
sweep of malicious regions would not have been triggered. As the session length increases, the 
performance of the HM and SM increases, whereas the performance of RM remains constant. 
For short and intermediate length sessions, HM is a better scheme than SM and RM. It has a 
higher true positive value than SM. Also, HNT has fewer monitoring peers changing positions 
than RM and hence it is preferred over RM. 
4.3.1.3 Message Overhead 
The trust manager updates the trust vector when it receives a feedback from a peer. Normal 
peers in SA and monitoring peers in RM, SM, and HM send feedback to the trust manager 
whenever they receive bad data. On not receiving a feedback, the trust manager updates the 
trust vector with a positive value. Nlonitoring peers in the SM and HM schemes also need to 
exchange messages when they change parents during the sweep operation. 
The message overhead of the proposed schemes was calculated as the sum of number of 
messages exchanged between monitoring peers and the trust value update messages sent to 
the trust manager. Figure 4.3.1.3 shows the results obtained for a media session of length 
75 with 16°~o malicious and 10%o monitoring peers. In SA, the average number of trust value 
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Figure 4.~ Average number of messages per iteration 
is because in the SA scheme all peers starting from the malicious peer to the peer at the leaf, 
send negative feedback to the trust manager. As the number of nodes increases the height of 
the tree increases causing more peers to send their feedback to the trust manager. 
4.4 PlanetLab Experiments 
Monitoring peers join and leave the network at frequent intervals. To avoid any jitter that 
can be introduced due to this periodic join and leave we proposed in Section 3.2.3, a formula 
to calculate the buffer size for the monitoring peers. To verify the effectiveness of a buffer in 
avoiding jitter, we conducted experiments over PlanetLab (pla) (19). 
The setup involved PlanetLab nodes as well as two local machines that act as server and 
receiver for the data. Data is streamed in the server using a VLC player (vlc) which sends out 
data to a PlanetLab node. PlanetLab nodes correspond to interior nodes of the overlay tree 
and are configured to multicast data. They route data to other PlanetLab nodes. The second 
local machine acts as a receiver and corresponds to the leaf node of the overlay tree. It has a 
VLC player listening at a specific port which plays the media being streamed. 
Monitoring nodes are PlanetLab nodes that are configured to join the overlay network 
at random intervals and at random positions. They maintain a buffer to prevent jitter and 
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Table 4.4 PlanetLab experiment setup 
Type Normal Nodes Monitor Node 
Local Network PC115-01 to PC115-05 popeye.cs.iastate.edu 
Intra-US planetlab-1.cs.princeton.edu 
planetlab l . wash. Internet 2. planet- lab. org 
planetlabl.cs.ucla.edu 




planetlab 1. iiitb. ac. in 
planetlab 1. info. ucl. ac. be 




calculate the number of data packets lost each time it joins the overlay tree. Data gathered by 
these monitoring nodes are collected and used for our analysis. 
To calculate the buffer size, it is required that the network latencies between the nodes of 
the overlay tree be known. Network latency is calculated by executing a "ping" before every 
experiment. The maximum value of time delay returned by the "ping" program is used in the 
buffer size calculations. 
Experiments were conducted under three different configurations. Each configuration has 
five machines that represent the interior nodes of a branch in the overlay multicast tree (Ta-
ble 4.4): 
• Local Network: All the machines that take part in the experiment are within the LAN. 
This configuration does not use PlanetLab nodes. 
• Intra-US: The PlanetLab nodes are distributed across United States. The selected nodes 
are spread along the east and west coasts of the country. 
• Inter-Continent: The PlanetLab nodes are distributed across the world. Selected nodes 
are spread out in Asia, Europe and America. 
The motivation of the experiment was to validate the buffer space calculations. A single 
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monitoring node joining the overlay network at different positions and at different instants of 
time will enable us to check for the correctness of the calculations. 
4.4.1 Experiment Results 
Table 4.5 Dropped packets measured through PlanetLab experiments 
Media Name Bit Rate(kbps) Maximum 
Buffer Size 
Number of Dropped 
Packets 
Intra-US AVSEQ14.mpg 1421 15 0 
Carnatic.mp3 128 2 0 
Inter-Continent AVSEQ14.mpg 1421 61 4 
Carnatic.mp3 128 8 0 
Table 4.6 Effect on viewer experience. Values indicate jitter that was seen 
without(with) monitoring nodes 






AVSEQ14.mpg Music Video 118 0(0) 8(8) 21(24) 
Carnatic.mp3 Audio File 252 0(0) 2(2) 3(3) 
We streamed a video file (AVSEQ14.mpg) and an audio file (Carnatic.mp3) in our experi-
ments. From the experiments it was found that each node in the overlay tree adds a delay of 
0.029 secs. This processing delay was calculated using the Local Network configuration and it 
corresponds to a delay of 3.17(0.5) packets for the video(audio) stream. The calculated values 
of buffer size had to be updated to accommodate this processing delay. The new value for 
the size of the buffer was calculated by taking into consideration both the processing and the 
propagation delays as shown below. 
b„-zZ > to — tr,-L -{- dn~ — dmz — PD~mzin~> -}- Difference in Numbero f Hops ~ 0.029 
where, "Difference in NumberofHops" is the difference in the number of nodes from the 
server to node n~ along the normal overlay tree and along the monitoring overlay tree respec-
tively. 
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In the Intea-US experiment setup, the maximum buffer size according to our calculations 
was found to be 15(2) packets for the video(audio) stream. Similarly, in the Inter-Continent 
setup the maximum buffer size was found to be 61(8) packets for the video(audio) stream. 
To check the validity of buffer space calculations, monitoring nodes during the experiment 
maintained a buffer whose size was set according the calculated values. Monitoring nodes 
were simulated to join each interior node twice during the experiments. The experiment was 
repeated 5 times for each setup. The results displayed in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 is the average 
value of all the trials. 
As seen in Table 4.5, introducing monitoring nodes with a buffer did not result in any 
lost packets in the Intra-US setup. Number of dropped packets in the Inter-Continent setup 
was 0 for the audio file and 4 for the video file. We presume the cause of dropped packets to 
be the increase in network delays. During the experiments, we observed that certain nodes 
have a bandwidth cap that would result in dropped packets. In our experiment setup, we 
have selected only those nodes that did not have this bandwidth cap. Also the network delays 
varied depending on the time of the day. The results correspond to the experiments that were 
conducted from 21:00 to 23:00 hours. 
We have also studied the end user experience under this experimental setup. We counted 
the number of times a user experiences a jitter while listening or watching the streaming 
media. What exactly constitutes a jitter may vary for different users, but in our experiments, 
we considered discontinuity, noise or garbled images as jitter. The high jitter value seen in 
Table 4.6 is a limitation of the application. The application does not control or manage the 
inter-packet delays. For the video file, the inter-packet delay is very small, and any variance 
in inter-packet arrival rates causes jitter. 
As seen in Table 4.G, introducing monitoring nodes does not degrade the viewing experience 
for the Intea-US setup. However in the Inter-Continent setup, we see an increase in the jitter 
for the video file while monitoring nodes are present. This jitter could be because of the 
dropped packets as explained earlier. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Trust Agent Infrastructure: We envision that trusted machines can be provided as part 
of a public infrastructure. It is desirable for a trusted machine to be able to use different 
uncorrelated entities (IP-addresses) at different times to avoid being detected by malicious 
peers. This infrastructure can be used in several other applications. For example, trusted 
peers can be used in P2P file sharing applications to identify peers sharing copyrighted material. 
Collusion: The proposed schemes do not address collusion. This is a common assumption and 
can also be seen in similar works (11). In our schemes, we can think of collusion attacks 
as a sequence of independent malicious activities. For example, malicious peers can cheat 
in a sequential manner such that at a given time only one malicious peer is active. To a 
monitoring scheme this attack is equivalent to Hypocritical-I peers cheating with a probability 
of 
n 
. Malicious peers can also collude by exchanging lists of IP-addresses of peers that have 
joined and left them in the current session. The intersection of these lists could point to the IP-
addresses of the monitoring peers. This attack is mitigated by the Trust Agent Infrastructure 
where each monitoring peer has a dynamic IP-address picked from a large address space of 
uncorrelated entries. Effect of Sybil Attacks: Forging of multiple identities constitute Sybil 
attack (6). Reputation systems are vulnerable to these attacks. A malicious peer can assume 
multiple identities. It can act malicious with one identity and continue to receive service by 
acting non-malicious with another identity. On being detected as malicious, it can leave the 
system and rejoin later with a different identity. Guard against Sybil Attacks: One way to 
counter this attack is through the use of free but irreplaceable pseudonyms, e.g., through 
the assignment of strong identities by a central trusted authority. In the absence of such 
mechanisms, a penalty can be imposed on all newcomers. The penalty may be in the form of 
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a monetary fee or could be in terms of requiring the peer to provide computation resources 
to the network. Punishment on detection: The malicious peer identification scheme should be 
independent of the punishment policy. Malicious peers for example could be 1) Removed from 
the system 2) Punished monetarily or 3) Provided bad service. Malicious peer identification 
schemes should be run multiple times in one session. The entire media session can be divided 
into small sub-sessions and malicious peers can be identified and punished at the end of each 
sub-session. Technique for distance measurements: The buffer size of a monitoring peer is 
dependent on propagation delays. These delays can be calculated using well known nodes 
called landmarks (14) . Distances between any two peers is the sum of the distance from each 
peer to its nearest landmark and the distance between the two landmarks. In monitoring 
schemes, normal peers inform the server its distance from the landmarks. Monitoring peers 
also calculate their distance from the landmark nodes. Using this distance information, delay 
calculations needed for the buffer space formula can be implemented. Bazzi and Konjevod show 
that malicious peers cannot cheat the system by pretending to be at different positions (3). 
47 
CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY 
Identifying malicious behavior and malicious peers is important for the success of P2P 
media streaming systems. Existing approaches concentrate on detecting malicious behavior 
and not on the problem of identifying malicious peers. In this thesis, we have identified 
different types of possible malicious behaviors. We have proposed and implemented 1) A Signed 
Acknowledgement (SA) scheme and 2) Three monitoring schemes belonging to the trust agent 
monitoring approach. These schemes were evaluated, compared and analyzed using a discrete 
event simulator written in C~--~-. Monitoring nodes in the trust agent monitoring approach 
need to maintain a buffer to avoid jitter. We have proposed a formula to calculate the size 
of this buffer. This model was validated by conducting experiments using the PlanetLab 
infrastructure. 
Simulation results show that SM and HM schemes are more successful than the SA scheme 
in detecting malicious peers. Success is quantified in terms of high true positive and low false 
positive values. For long sessions, SM has a higher true positive and lower false positive value 
than the HM scheme. HM on the other hand has higher true positive values for sessions of 
short and intermediate lengths. HM scheme also has fewer monitoring peers changing positions 
at the higher levels of the tree than in the SM scheme. This results in a more stable overlay 
tree. In general, monitoring schemes have an advantage over SA scheme in that the structure 
of the overlay tree does not change drastically with every trust value update. On the other 
hand, in the SA scheme there is a constant movement of peers after every negative feedback. 
This difference is significant because the construction of the overlay tree may be optimized 
on several parameters such as locality of nodes, network traffic etc. Constant changes in the 
overlay structure may result in an overlay tree that is not optimal. 
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Experiments conducted on PlanetLab validate the buffer calculation model. Results show 
that packets are not lost whenever monitoring nodes join the tree. Analysis of the end user 
experience indicate that there is no degradation in the video and audio quality because of 
monitoring nodes. 
This is the first work that concentrates on identifying malicious peers. We hope that this 
work triggers many more interesting problems and novel solutions, e.g., locality aware trusted 
peers. As future work, effects of colluding peers and schemes that are able to identify them 
will be considered. 
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APPENDIX ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
TCP Implementation in Linux 
Flow of Input TCP Packet 
When a packet is received by the NIC, it is put into kernel memory by the card DMA 
engine. The available data area must be large enough to hold the maximum size of packet that 
a particular interface can receive. The interrupt handler creates the packet descriptor (struct 
sk_buff ). During subsequent processing, the packet data remains at the same location. The 
packet is manipulated through the pointer struct sk_buff*. 
General Data Structures 
• s,~_buff : TCP needs to store a large set of variables. It maintains data and status of 
both incoming and outgoing packets. In the networking code, virtually every function is 
invoked with a sk_buff 
...r~~ct. sk.,buff £ 
unat.., rac;cl rhar •F.a ~c7: 
UllSii CCr'awrl Ct1.7T 'dakei; 





Figure A.l sk_buff structure 
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Description of sk_buff structure 
— list points to the queue where the socket buffer is currently located. 
— s~; points to the socket that created the packet. 
— stamp specifies the time when the packet arrived in the Linux (in jiffies) 
— dev states the current network device on which the socket buffer operates. Once the 
routing decision is made, dev points to the network adapter on which the packet 
leaves 
— len specifies the length of a packet. 
— data, tail point to currently valid packet data. 
— head, end point to the total location that can be used for packet data. 
— The space between head and data is called headroom, and the space between tail 
and end is called tailroom. 
Description of the procedures of the sk_buff structure 
— Alloc_skb: Allocate a network buffer. The returned buffer has no headroom and 
a tail room of size bytes. The object has a reference count of one. The return is 
the buffer. On a failure the return is NULL. Buffers may only be allocated from 
interrupts using a gfp_mask of GFP_ATOMIC. 
— S~;b_reserve: Increase the headroom of an empty &sk_buff by reducing the tail room. 
This is only allowed for an empty buffer. 
— Slab_put: This function extends the used data area of the buffer. If this would exceed 
the total buffer size the kernel will panic. A pointer to the first byte of the extra 
data is returned. 
• sock: It maintains the state of a connection.It keeps data about a specific TCP connection 
(e.g., TCP state) or virtual UDP connection. 
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• tcp_opt: It is part of the sock structure and is used to maintain the TCP connection state. 
Both IP and UDP are stateless protocols with a minimum need to store information about 
their connections. 
Prototype Implementation of SA 
®verview 
We developed a prototype 1 to demonstrate the feasibility and complexity of implementing 
the SA scheme. The implementation was done in Linux 2.6.13.4 kernel and was tested by 
implementing a simple TCP socket program. We will give an overview of the important data 
structures related to the TCP/IP stack and details of code changes needed to implement SA, 
SA Implementation 
The files that handle most of the processing of tcp packets are tcp_input.c and tcp_output.c 
The functions that we were relevant for SA were tcp_ack() and tcp_sendack(). The former 
creates an ack packet and prepares it for transmission while the latter receives and processes 
the ack packet. The following code was added to the tcp_ack() function of the tcp~nput.c file. 
An analogous change was done in the tcp_output.c file. 
Algorithm 5 Code snippet from the SA prototype 
l: struct sk_bu f f *skb; 
2: tmp = 2 * TCP~IAXIIEADER; 
3: skb = alloc_skb(tmp, GFP_KERNEL); 
4: skb_reserve(skb,TCP_MAX~IEADER); 
5: data =skb Put(skb,TCP_MAX_HEADER); 
6: skb— > csum = csum_and_copy_from_user(from, data, copy, len, &err); 
7: tcp_send_skb(sk,sleb, queue_it); 
1The prototype was implemented along with Patricio Galdames. 
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